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PETITION.· 
'l'o the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: 
Your petitioner, H. A. Barrett, respectfully shows unto the 
court that he is aggrieved by a decree of the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, Virginia., entered on the 3rd day 
of August, 1933. A transcript of the record in the said cause 
is herewith filed . 
.A.SSIGN~IENTS OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner assigns as error the entering of the said de-
cree on the 3rd day of August, 1933, in.which said decree the 
court held that the contract of your petitioner by virtue of 
his endorsement of the note for the· principal sum of $20,-
000.00, mentioned in said decree, was a contract of primary 
liability as though the said H. A. Barrett was maker of the 
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note, and was not a contract of secondary liability as if the 
said H. A. Barrett were an ordinary endorser of said note,. 
and that even though the liability of H. A. Barrett may have 
been secondary prior to the entry of the judgment on· said 
note,- nevertheless, the entry of said judgment merged his 
liability into a fixed and primary liability, and that the lan-
guage of the endorser's contract is definite and certain. 
Your petitioner further alleges that the said court erred: 
1. In not decreeing that the liability of H. A. Barrett w~s 
secondary rather than primary; 
2. In failing· to decree that the language of the endorser's 
contract is ambiguous; 
3. In failing to permit H. A. Barrett to introduce extra-
neous evidence to prove that both he and the payee as well as 
all other interested parties considered the said Barrett to be 
an accommodation endorser with only the liability fixed by 
statute for such accommodation endorser; 
4. The failure of the court to permit the said Barrett to 
prove what construction the parties themselves placed upon 
the contract when there was no controversy on the subjecf; 
5. In decreeing that all the issues raised by the answer and 
cross-bill and the supplemental answer and cross-bill of tho. 
said Barrett concerning his alleged secondary liability on 
said note· and .judgment, and his alleged release therefrom on 
account of extension of time to the other parties, and on ac- · 
count of the failure of the plaintiff to use diligence in col· 
lecting from the other parties, and on account of deposits 
rnade by the other parties with the plaintiff, and concerning 
the alleged duty of the plaintiff to exhaust all remedies against 
the other parties, \Vere immaterial to the proper disposition 
of this cause and were not defenses available in same to said 
defendant, and in striking out the said answer and cross-bill 
and the supplemental. answer and cross-bill of the said Bar~ 
rett; and, 
6. In failing to decree that said Barrett's liability as a 
party secondarily liable continued as such after the entry of 
said judgment. 
FACTS. 
The defendant, H. A. Barrett, contends that the following 
are the facts concerning the matter in controversy and that 
he ought to be given an opportunity to prove same: 
On the 9th day of June, 1921, Barrett & Brother, a partner-
ship composed of T. H. Barrett and M. E. Barrett, executed a 
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bond for $20,t0.00 payable on demand to the order of 
Vaughan & Com any, Bankers. At the solicitation of both the 
obligors and th obligee, H. A. Barrett became an accommo-
dation endorser. On May 1,1922, C. C. Vaughan, Jr., attorney 
in fact appointed in said bond, conf~ss-ed a judgment on said 
bond in the Circuit Court of Southampton County, ;virginia, 
and the Clerk of the said court docketed said judgment in 
favor of Vaughan & Company, Bankers, and against Barrett 
& Brother and the endorsers, 'including your petitioner, which 
said judgment appears to be a joint and several liability 
against the makers and endorsers ; that between the execu-
.tion of the said bond and confession of said judgment the said 
obligee extended the time for the payment of said debt by a 
binding agreement between said obligee and the said oblig-
ors, the principal debtors, without the knowledge and consent 
of the said endorser and without reserving to said obligee the 
right of recourse against said endorser; that said Vaughan & · 
Company, Bankers, have been continuously since the execu-
tion of said bond, and a.t the present time. the owners in 
full of said bond and judgment; that in August, 1930, a valid 
and binding agreement was made between the said judgment 
creditor and the principal debtors, Barrett & Brother, to ex-
tt~nd the time of the payment of said judgment until N ovem-
ber 1, 1930, in the event T. H. Barr·ett, one of the principal 
debtors, would have a lif-e insurance policy for the sum of 
$25,000 00 on his life executed and delivered to said obligee, 
in which the said obligee was to be beneficiary. The said in-
surance policy was executed and delivered as agreed, accepted 
by the said judgment creditor and the time for the payment 
of said obligation was accordingly extended to November 1. 
1930, all of which extensions of time were made without the 
knowledge and consent of the said endorser. The said endor-
ser knew nothing of any of tho said extensions of time until on 
or about the 20th day of January, 1933, at 'vliich time .he im-
mediately proceeded to assert his rights by claiming that 
he had been discharged and released from any and all lia-
bility on account of said bond and/or judgment. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT. 
The bond and endorsement fully appear in the decree en-
tered in this cause on August 3, 1933, but for convenience the 
statement over the signatures of the endorsers is here ~opied: 
''We, the endorsers named below, waive presentment, pro-
test, demand of payment and notice of non-payment and guar-
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an tee the payment of the within note at maturity, or any .. time 
thereafter, and agree that all the provisions therein shall 
·apply to and bind us as though we were makers.'' 
It will be noted that his honor, Judge James L. McLemore, 
held that the contract of the endorser was the same as though 
the endorser had been maker·. Of course, his honor did not 
intend to say that the endorser was maker as the language of 
the endorsement in which the endorsers speak of themselves 
as ''the endorsers named below'' and later on speak of be-
ing bound ''as though'' they were makers, but his honor does 
hold in effect that for all practical purposes the endorsers 
are makers, that is to say that they have no defenses to the 
obligations which are not permitted to makers. Inasmuch 
as the only defense in this case, that is the extension of time 
to a n1aker or the principal debtor is the only defense avail-
able under the pleadings to the endorser, it is of primary im-
portance to ascertain first of all whether their contract makes 
them principal debtors or parties secondarily liable. 
Section 5753 of .the Qode of Nirginia provides as follows : 
''The person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the 
person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely re-
quired to pay the same. All other persons are 'secondarily' 
liable.'' 
Section 5625 of the Code of tVirginia provides : 
''A person placing his signature upon an instrument other-
wise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an 
endorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his 
intention to be. bound in some other capacity.'' 
Section 5579, Sub-section 6, of the Code of Virginia pro-
vides: 
''Where a sig·nature is so placed upon the instrument that 
it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same 
intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser.'' 
Neither the position of the signature of H. A. Barrett on 
this bond, the signature. of the endorsers being on the back of 
the. bond, or the. language of the endorser leaves any doubt 
that the parties intended to be bound as endorsers, but the con-
tention of the obligee is that the language of the endorsers en-
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larged their liability to that of the makers of this particular 
bond. If the parties are endorsers they are, of course, par-
ties secondarily liable to whom the defense of extension of 
time is available un1ess the contract of the endorser has been 
enlarged so as to proolude. him from making this d-efense. 
Has this endorser's contract so enla~ged the usual contract of 
·an endorser 1 He says in effect ''I will be bound as an en-
dorser, a party secondarily liable except in so far as the pro-
visions of the bond are concerned and as to them I bind my-
self as maker". If the bond had contained in it the provision 
that time might be extended without releasing any of the 
obligors then this endorser could not avail himself of this de-
fense. But there is nothing whatever in the provison of the 
bond concerning any extension of time. In fact it is quite ap-
parent from the language of the endorsers that the pro-
visions referred to by him were limited to those which au-
thorized C. C. Vaughan, Jr., to confess the judgment. 
It is therefore contended that Barrett was a party 
secondarily liable, but who had enlarged the contract of an 
ordinary endorser to make him liable as maker as ag·ainst all 
provisions, that is stipulations, in the body of the bond, and 
inasnn1ch ·as there does not appear in the body of the bond 
any provision that time might be extended, then this defense 
which is not available to a co-maker is nevertheless .available 
to him, a party secondarily liability. 
I have been unable to find but one decision in America in 
'vhich similar language used by an endorser was construed 
by the court. 
In the case of Kistner vs. Peters, 79 N. E. 311 (Ill.), the 
note was payable to the order of Rosa 1\I. Rinehart, signed by 
E. N. Rinehart and Philip Kistner. On the date of the note 
Rosa :NI. Rinehart made the following endorsement : 
''I hereby acknowledge myself principal maker of this note 
with E. N. Rinehart, and my liability as such principal jointly 
with him. Rosa M. Rinehart. '' 
Hettie J. Peters brought suit against makers and Rosa J\.f. 
Rinehart alleging all to be makers. 
Held: ·"It is earnestly contended that by endorsement 
Rosa :NI. Rinehart became a joint maker of the instrument. 
vVith this contention we cannot agree. An attempt to become 
a principal maker of a negotiable instrument with one of sev.-
eral makers is an anomaly in the law .. Of course it may be 
done but the evidence of that intention must clearly appear, 
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and to give the endorsement in this case that effect would de-
stroy the neg·otiability of the instrument and do violence to 
the intention of Airs. Rinehart. She manifestly intended to 
assign the note to Hettie J. Peters. "\Vhat purpose she may 
have had in the use of the language preceding her signature 
can only be a n1atter of conjecture. Probably it was with somq 
idea of enlarging her liability as indorser. But however this 
may he we 'vill not attribute to that language the intention of 
relieving· the makers of all legal liability. The name of a 
payee on the back of a negotiable instrument will transfer 
the legal title to the same, and it makes no difference that 
there is written about it language enlarging the liability of 
the indorser, such as a guarantee of the payment of the note.'' 
Heaton vs. Hulbert, 3 Scam. 489; Her~ring vs. lVoodhull, 29 
Ill. 92, 81 Am. Dec. 296; Judson vs. Goodwin, 37 TIL 286. 
''Our conclusion is that the language I hereby acknowl-
edge myself a principal 1naker, etc .. made without legal mean-
ing or effect, and that under the allegations of the declara-
tion the signature of Rosa JvL Rinehart makes her an en-
dorser. In other words, the endorsement unexplained does 
not show an intention other than to assign and transfer the 
legal title of .the instrument to the appellee." 
ERRORS NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 5. 
\tVhile it is contended as above stated that the language of 
the endorsers' contract shows conclusively ~heir intention to 
be bound as parties secondarily liable and binding themselves 
as makers as regards the ''provisions'' of the bond does not 
make then1 principal debtors, it seems that before putting on 
the endorsers' contract a construction which would make them 
principal debtors the court ought to avail itself of the oppor-
tunity of ascertaining what construction the parties them-
selves placed upon the language and also what were the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction which would throw 
light on the proper construction of the language used. 
3 R. C. L.-1124. 
""\Vhatever diversities of interpretation may be found in 
the authorities, as to whether the party signing on the re-
verse of the instrument should be deemed an absolute promisor 
or maker, or merely a g·uarantor or indorser, there is one prin-
ciple of the subject which has been almost universally ad-
mitted, and that is,. that the interpretation of the contract 
ought in every case to be such as will carry into effect the 
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.intention .of the parties. And in the better considered cases 
it has been conceded that the intention of the parties is not 
to be determined in accordance with the implication arising 
.from the mere fact of signature, in short, that intention is not 
to be imputed, but that it may be sought in the facts and cir-
cumstances a.t the time of the transaction. And, therefore, it 
is held that parol evidence is admissible to prove the character 
Qf the contract by which the indorser bound himself, as under* 
stood by the parties to such contract. If the ~ontract set up 
is different from that which attaches by presumption of law, 
it must be established by proof, showing that both parties, 
promisor and promisee, so intended and agreed. Proof of 
actual intention will countervail the pri1na facie presumptions 
'vhich the law indulges with reference to the obligation as~ 
s~med by the indorser.'' 
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sect. 710 Parol Evidence. 
''When the note is negotiable the question is by no means 
capable of such easy and satisfactory solution, but whatever 
diversities of interpretation may be found in the authorities 
on the subject, they very generally concur though not with 
entire unanimity, that as between the immediate parties, the 
interpretation ought to be in every case such as will carry this 
intention into effect, and that their intention may be made 
out by parol proof of facts and circumstances which took 
. place at the time of ·the transaction.'' 
''If the person who places his name on the back of the note 
before the payee intended at the time to be bound to the payee 
only as a g·uarantor of the maker, he shall not be deemed to 
be a joint pro1nissor or an absolute promisor to the payee. 
If he intended to bind himself as a. surety or joint maker of 
the not-e, he will not be permitted to claim afterwards that 
he was only a guarantor. .And if he intended only to be bound 
as an indorser, the better opinion is that this also may be 
shown as between him and the payee.'' 
Richardson vs. Planters Bank, 94 Va. 130. 
''It may be said in general terms that the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction, when proved, do not vary nor 
contradict the writing, but, while shedding light on its mean-
ing, are consistent with its language, and make clear what 
was otherwise obscure. Oral evidence to this extent is always 
admissible in the construction of written instruments where 
ambiguity exists.'' 
8 Sup;reme Court of .Appeals of iVirginia. 
Shenandoah Land Company. vs. Clarke, 106 Va. 100, 107. 
"To ascertain the intent of the parties is the fundamental. 
rule in the construction of an agreement; and in such con-
struction courts look to the language employed, the subject 
Jnatter and the surrounding circumstances. They are never 
shut out fron1 the same light which the parties enjoyed when 
the contract was executed, and to that end they are entitled 
to pJace themselves in the same situation which the parties 
who made the contract occupied, so as to view the circum-
stances as they viewed them, and so to judge of the' meaning 
of the words and of the correct application .of the language 
to the things described.'' Talbott vs. R. &5 D. R. Co., 31 Gratt. 
685. 
Camp vs. Wilson, 97 V a. 265, 270. 
"It is the duty of the court to construe a written contract, 
but ·when ever it is necessary to refer to testimony of wit-
nesses in order to ascertain the contract or to ascertain facts 
in the light of which the contract is to be const~ed, then the 
court is bound to refer such controverted matters of testimony 
~o the decision of the jury'' 
Roanoke vs. !Jlair, 107 1Va. 639. 
"In construing a 'vriting·, extrinsic evidence may, as a rule, 
be· admitted only for the purpose of explaining a latent am-
biguity, or of applying ambiguous words to their proper sub-
ject matter.'' 
Elterich vs. Leicht, 107 S. E. 735-740. 
The grantee of a lot of land in the city of Norfolk was pro-
hibited for 21 years from using it on which to erect a factory 
building or an apartment house: 
The primary question in issue was whether a certain house 
bein~ erected on the premises was an ''apartment house'' 
withm the meaning of the contract. · 
F(eld : ''When a word or phrase used in a covenant has 
more than one meaning·, judicial knowledge of existing cir-
cumstances and conditions is indispensable to a correct ex-
. position of the law upon the subject, and to that end parol evi-
dence is admissible.'' 
"One of the familiar rules applicable to the interpretation 
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of ambiguous eovenants and agreements is to ascertain, as 
nearly as may be, the situation of the parties, their surround-
ings and eircUiilstances, the occasion and apparent object 
of their stipulations, and, from all these sources, to gather the 
meaning and intent of their language.'' 
''Regard must be had to the· object which the covenant was 
designed to aecomplish, a~d the language used is to be read 
in an ordinary or popular, and not in a legal and technical 
sense.'' 
"The language used must be given its obvious meaning, and 
be construed in accordance with the intention of the parties, 
assuming that the restriction was put into the deed not sim-
ply for the benefit of the grantor, but for the benefit of every 
o·wner of property and of every resident on the street.'' 
Harris vs. Rot·aback, 137 Mich. 292, 100 N. W. 391, 109 Am .. 
St. Rep. 681. 
'' Partieular words in such a covenant are to be given -the 
meaning that was commonly given to them at the time the in-
strument containing the covenants was executed.'' White vs. 
Colll.ngs Bldg. & Const. Co., 82 App. Div. 1, 81 N. Y. Supp. 
434. 
In the case of Citizens Bank of Norfolk ~vs. Tay·lor ,(: Con~­
pany, 104 Va. 164, the court held: 
''The court will adopt that construction of the contract 
placed upon it by the parties themselves during the period 
when there was no controversy on the subject, and which is a 
reasonable construction.'' 
The eourt said in the case of Hairston vs. Hill, 87 S. E. 
573 (Va·. 1916) : . 
"In the interpretation of contracts regard must be given 
to the intention of the parties and their version of the in-
struments meaning.''· 
In the case of Epps vs. HardaW'ay, 115 S. E. 712 (Va.1923), 
the court held: 
"A written contract must be read as a whole, in order to 
gather the intention of the parties.'' 
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ERROR NO.6. 
The san1e rule which provides for the discharge of par-
ties secondarily liable is applicable and enforced under stat-
ute, the common law and in equity. 
Section 5682 provides : 
''A person secondarily liable on an instrument is dis-
charged * * • parag·raph 6, by any agreement binding 
upon the holder to extend the time of payment or to postpon~ 
the holder's right to enforce the instrument unless made with 
the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right 
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved.'' 
Cape Charles Bank vs. pranners Excg., 120 :Va. 771, 777; 
92 S. E. 918. 
"The rule of Code 1904, 2841a, sub. sec. 120 (6), that any 
agreement binding on the holder to extend the time of pay-
ment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instru-
ment, unless made with the assent of the party s·econdarily lia-
ble, or unless the right of recourse against such party 
is expressly reserved, releases such party was the rule at 
common law.'' 
Ward vs. V ass, 7 Leigh 136. 
"It l1as long been the settled rule of equity that where there 
are principal debtor and surety, if the creditor, without the 
knowledge or consent of the surety makes any contract with 
the principal, by 'vhich he ties up his han<,ls from proceeding 
to recover his debt, or discharging any specific lien on the 
principal's property, out of which he mig·ht have l:fiade the 
debt, he releases the surety from his obligation. The courts 
of la,v, seeing the justice of this rule, have, in controlling 
their process of execution, translated it to their forum, and 
exercise it in the spirit of equity. 
"Now, let us remember that it is no technical rule of the 
conunon law which we are considering but a rule of the courts 
of equity administered on equitable principles.'' 
The reasons for the rule are thus stated in 21 R. C. L., at 
page 1018: 
''This is in accordance with the broader and more general 
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doctrine that the engagement of a surety is not to be enlarged · 
<>r varied without his consent, and that any agreement to do 
so by the creditor is an attempt on his part to m~e for the 
surety a new contract to whicll he never assented. The time 
{)f payment may be quite as important a consideration to the 
surety as the amount he has promised conditionally to pay. 
He may have agreed to become responsible, because he then 
had in his possession property of the principal debtor suffi· 
eient to indemnify him against lo~s. When the time fixed in 
the contract has passed without notification to him of the de-
fault of the principal, he may naturally suppose his liability 
to be at an end, and thus release the means of reimbursement, 
at his ultimate Joss, if the chang·ed contract is subsequently 
enforced against him. Again, a surety has the right, on pay-
ment of the debt, to be subrog·ated to all the rights of tho 
-creditor, and to proceed at once to collect it from the princi-
pal; but if the creditor has tied his own hands from proceed· 
ing promptly, by extending the time of collection, the hands 
Qf the surety will equally be bound; and before they are 
loosed, by the expiration of the extended credit, the principal 
debtor may have become insolvent and the right of subrogation 
rendered worthless. It should be observed, however, that it 
is really unimportant whether the extension given has actu-
ally proved prejudicial to the surety or not. The rule stated 
is quite independent of the event, and the faet that the princi-
})al is insolvent or that the extension granted promised to be 
beneficial to the surety would give no right to the creditor 
to change the terms of the contract without the ~owledge 
or consent of the surety. Nor does it matter for how short 
a period the time of payment may be extended. The prin-
cip1e is the same whether the time is long or short. The 
creditor must be in such a situation that when the surety 
-comes to be substituted in his place by paying the debt, he 
may have an hnmediate right of action against the principal. 
The suspension of the right to sue for a month, or even a day, 
is as effectual to release the surety as a year or two years. 
The defense of a binding extension of time given by a credi-
tor to the principal is usually available to the surety at law 
or in equity." 
Baird vs. Rice, 1 Call 18. 
Rice was surety on Black's bond to Baird. Baird obtained 
a joint judgment against both and issued an ex~cution. 
Black's property was levied on and on the day of sale Baird 
having received part of the money directed the sheriff to re-
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store the property to Black. Black afterwards made away 
with all his effects. Baird later sued out another execution 
against Rice. On the day of sale Black had offered the pay-
ment on ~ondition that his property be released which Rice 
and Baird were urged to accede to. Rice declared he was 
satisfied and Baird accepted the payment. Rice afterwards 
solicited a loan with which to pay off. the judgment and offered 
to give a deed of trust. These negotiations, however, came to 
naught and the execution issued which this suit sought to en-
join. The opinion of the court found that as a matter of 'fact 
Rice pressed the sale and did not consent to the postponement. 
Held: 
''The testimony in th:s cause is, that the plaintiff, instead 
of leaving· the sheriff to encounter the difficulties in the legal 
matter, made a compro~ise, and authorized the sheriff to re-
lease the property; Rice, the now appellee, strenuously insist-
ing, all the while, that the sheriff should proceed to act in 
the legal manner: and, as an inducement thereto, offering to 
give up his claim to the property in question under· the deed 
of trust. 
''This conduct, I conceive, as far as it respected the sum 
to be paid in future, amounted to a new contract; a simple 
contract indeed, instead of a judgment; and one whereby Bla.ck 
alone became liable, instead of Black and 'Rice; and the con-
. sideration of this new assumpsit on the part of Black, was the 
releaset;nent of his property then in the hands ·of the sheriff. 
"However improvident this contract might be, in these 
respects, no person can say that Baird had not a right to 
make it; nor, that the consideration on which it was founded 
was not a good one to sustain an action against Black; but, 
the effect is, that the old contract was thereby at an end, and 
with it Rice's liability to pay the debt.'' 
Humphrey vs. Hitt, 6 Gratt. 510. 
Humphrey brought suit against Y erbey and Hitt on bonds 
in which Yerbey was principal and Hitt was surety. Execu-
tions were issued and the sheriff to the home of Yerbey to 
levy and Y erbey produced to the sheriff a written order from 
the plaintiff to return the execution to the Clerk's Office, there 
to remain until his further order; the sheriff thereupon re-
turned them endorsing on the execution the statement that 
they were returned by plaintiff's order. Yerbey testified 
that at the time of the execution he had ample property in 
.. 
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.his possession with which to satisfy them. Later executions 
were issued against Hitt, who thereupon applied to the court 
for injunction. 
Held: 
''It is perfectly well settled, ~nd has been properly ad-
Initted in the argument that a surety is not absolved by the 
want of diligence on the part of the creditor in regard to his 
demand against the principal debtor. A defense on the ground 
of mere laches would, indeed, be inconsistent with the· rela-
tion of the parties * * ~ It follows that though a dis-
charg-e of the. debt, whether by principal or surety, is avail-
able for either, yet that the surety can have no peculiar 
equity against the creditor to be absolved from his obliga-
tion, arising directly from the mere relation betwe-en them; 
but that such equity must be derived from the equities of the 
surety against his prineipal, and the infringement thereof by 
the conduct of the creditor. If the remedies or the rights of 
the surety against his principal be destroyed or defeat-ed by 
. the creditor, that furnishes a plain equity on the part of the 
surety against the further pursuit of the creditor; which is 
either absolut-e, or to· the extent of the injury he has sus-
tained. · 
''Now, as the engagement of the surety is only coextensive 
with that of his principal, and his equities against him arise 
altogether out of non-performanee of the latt-er, it follows that 
the creditor has no right to alter the terms of his contract with 
the principal, to the prejudice of the surety, without his con-
sent. If, therefore, the creditor, without consent, makes an 
oblig·atory agreement with the principal, by whieh time .for 
payment is extended to h:~, so as to tie the hands of the 
creditor fron1 proceeding in the interval to enforce the origi-
nal contract, the consequence is, that the remedies of the 
surety against his prineipal are for the sam.e period sus-
pended, s.o as to expose him to a hazard of loss not contem-
plated by his undertaking; and this is enough to absolve him 
from his obEgation, without enquiry into the question of 
actual loss.'' 
''It has even been held, that the .. release or restoration 
·of the goods by the creditor, operates at law as a discharge 
of the judgment, at least without the agreem·ent of the debtor 
· express or implied to the contrary; and when the surety is 
also a party to. the judgment, he cannot, without his own con· 
sent, .be affected by such agreement of the prineipal, and ifi 
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discharged both at la'v and in equity; and when he is not a 
party to the judgment, though he is not discharged at law, 
he is in equity, to the extent of the value of the goods.'' 
Ward ·vs. V ass, 7 Leigh 136. 
Vass obtained a judgment against ,V. Thompson, E. Thomp-
son and Ward on a forthcoming bond taken under an execu-
tion recovered by Vass against W. Thompson. Thompson 
was the principal and E. Thompson and Ward were the sure-
ties. Vass had an execution issued and then requested of the 
sureties if they were willing for him to indulge W. Thompson, 
the principal. They stated that they were agreeable to this. 
Thereupon V ass stayed his execution until further orders. 
Ward, thereafter on various occassions, expressed his grati-
fication to .Vass for the indulgences Va~s was giving v..r. 
Thompson and requested him to continue the indulgences. 
In October, 1827, Vass sued out an execution against the 
three defendants which was levied on the principal debtors 
wheat, a slave and some horses. The sheriff's return showed 
that this execution was stayed at the request of the plaintiff. 
This request was in the form of a letter in which the plaintiff 
said that he had a~reed with Thompson to sell the wheat 
in the form of flour privately and apply the proceeds to the 
debt and requested further proceedings suspended. $200.00 
was realized from the flour and credited on the execution. 
In November, 1829, Vass sued out a new execution against 
the three defendants. This execution was quashed for rea-
son_s not apparent in the opinion. 
In April, 1830, the plaintiff moved for an execution 
against the three. The motion was resisted on the ground that 
-:\Tass by suspending proceedings on the execution of October, 
1827, and "subsequently giving indulgence to the principal, 
had discharged the sureties.'' 
Held: ''It has long been the settled rule of equity that 
"'·here there are principal debtor and surety, if the creditor, 
without the knowledge and consent of the surety makes any 
contract with the principal, by which he ties up his hands 
from proceeding to recover his debt, or discharging any spe.:. 
cific lien on the principal's property, out of which he might 
have made the debt, he releases the surety from his obliga-
tion. The courts of la,v, seeing the justice of this rule, have,. 
in controlling their process of execution, translated it to their 
forum, and exercise it in the s-pirit of equity .. " 
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However, in this case, the sureties were not discharged be-
cause the indulgence 'vas plainly with the consent of the sure-
ties. 
The court said: 
''Now, l-et us remember that it is no technical rule of the 
eommon la,v, which we are considering, but a rule of the 
-courts of equity, administered on equitable principles. H-ere 
'vere the sureties and the creditors cooperating to the same 
end ; and that end, the benefit of the sureties.'' 
Wells vs. Hughes, 89 Va. 543. 
This suit was brought to inforce the lien of a judgment 
which had been recovered by one Jones against Utz and Wells 
jointly, as principal and surety for the payment of purchase 
money evidenced and due by the bonds of Utz and Wells for 
land purchased by Utz from Jones, Special Commissioner. 
It was contended by Wells that the contract of him as surety 
(page 548) was altered or violated in its spirits by permitting 
Utz, th~ purchaser, to pay his purchase money in irregular 
amounts and at irregular times, and that Jones had extended 
the time for the payment of the debt. 
The court said: 
"But even if it were true, as expr-essly it is not, that Com· 
missioner Jones expressly promised to indulge Utz for a defi· 
nite time, it is not pretended that such promise or such action 
was based on a valuabl-e consideration; and it was, therefore, 
11-udum pacturm. The principal debtors paying a part, or prom· 
ising· to pay the whole debt, which he was bound to pay, is no 
consideration. 
''The indulgence, to have Lne effect of relea~ung a surety 
must be shown to have heen given in pursuance of a binding, 
legal contract, upon a valuable consideration, and without the 
consent of the surety.,,. · 
Adams vs. Logan, 27 Gratt. 201. 
A. suit was brought by Adams and Barbour to enjoin a 
judgment recovered against them and Womack by one Lo~an 
for $3,000.00. Womack was principal debtor and the plaintiffs 
were sureties on the $3,000.00 bond. It was contended that the 
. creditor, by accepting a trust deed from the principal 
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debtor, extended the time of payment. The court held that the 
trust deed was merely collateral security and "it did not tie 
up the hands of the creditor for a single moment from pursu-
ing the debtor at law". 
Coff1nan vs. Moore, 29 Gratt. 244. 
This was a suit in equity brought by two Coffmans and 
Strayer to enjoin a judgment which had been recovered 
against them and others. The complainants claim that they 
we~e sureties on the bond on 'vhich the judgment was recov-
ered and that the creditor had made an arrangement with the 
principal debtor to withhold enforcing· his claim until Sept., 
1870. The extension agreement had been made in J uile, 1870. 
''The law is well settled in Virginia, that the obligors in a 
joint obligation, are alike bound to the creditor as principals, 
whatever may be the relations between themselves as princi-
pal and surety. The obligation of all and each of them to 
the creditor is absolute and unconditional; and there is no ob-
ligation of diligence on the part of the creditor to either of 
them. In the language of Baldwin, J ., in Humphrey vs. H itt, 
6 Gratt. 523, 'It is the duty of the surety, as well as the prin-
cipal, to see to the payment of the money, and the forbear-
ance of the creditor is.a tacit indulgence given to both, in which 
the acquiescence of the one is equally significant with that 
of the other'. He has no equity against the creditor on· the 
ground of his relation of surety to the .principal debtor. But 
he has equities and remedies against his principal. He may 
pay the debt and have his action or motion against him for 
· reimbursement; or, if he is apprehensive of loss by the delay 
of the creditor, he may file his bill in chancery against the 
principal, to compel him to pay the debt; or he may file his 
bill in equity against the creditor, to compel him to sue, upon 
· being indemnified against the consequences of risk, ·delay and 
·expense; or he may, by 'vritten notice under statute (Code of 
1873, ch. 114, 4 and 5) be released from his liability if the 
creditor, after the service of the notice, should u.nreasonably 
delay to institute suit, ~r fail to pr-osecute the same with due 
diligence to judgment and by execution. lie is entitled to these 
remedies against his principal, in order that he may be in-
demnified and saved harmless on account of his voluntary un-
q.ertaking in his behalf; and if the creditor acts in a way to 
· deprive him ·Of these rmnedies against his principal, he re-
leases him from his obligation. Hence, if the creditor makes 
a binding agreement with the principal debtor to extend the 
6 
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time of payment without the consent of the surety, he makeR· 
a new contract 'vith the principal, whereby the surety is de-
prived of his ren1edies against the latter during the suspen-
sion. A proceeding by notice under the statute would be un-
availing to him. He is deprived of his remedy in the mean-
time by bill quia tintet, and he cannot, even by payment of the 
debt, proceed against his principal to be reimbursed by action 
or motion. According·ly it is held that the creditor, by tieing 
up his hands by a contract with the principal debtor to extend 
the tim:e of payment for ever so short a period without the 
sureties consent, absolves the surety from his obligation. 
without even an inquiry as to the amount of loss he has sus-
tained.'' 
JtValker·vs. Co1nmonwealth, 18 Gratt. 13. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia recovered judgment against 
Watkins and others, sureties of Watkins and Watkins and 
executions were issued thereon. Watkins was sergeant of 
the town of Danville and had misappropriated some of the 
funds of the town. 
''There is nothing in any case decided by this court, so 
far as I am a'vare, at all in conflict with .. the principle before 
stated. The decisions of this court 'vhich were relied on in 
the argument as having a bearing upon this subject, are cases 
in which sureties sought relief, generally by motions to quash 
executions on account of son1e act of the creditor done, as 
they supposed, in derogation of their rights; as by making a 
new contract with the principal debtor which tied the hands 
of the creditor, or by releasing the lien of a levy on the prop-
erty of the principal debtor, without the consent of the sure-
ties. In this case there was no contract between the creditor 
and debtor, princi})al or sureties, which tied the hands of the 
creditor for an instant; indeed, no con~ract at all behveen 
them, except that on which the judgments were obtained. The 
orders given by the attorney-general and auditor were 
founded on no valuable consideration, and were recoverable 
at pleasure, though that of the auditor was for a. stay of pro-
ceedings for sixty days. And the act of assembly, as was 
. properly conceded in the argument, merely released the dam-
ages on condition of the payment of principal, interest and 
costs into the treasury on or before the 1st day of August, 
1876, ~nd did not give a moment's stay of proceedings on the 
execqtions, or in any n1anner affect the levy thereof. And in 
. addition to all this, as I think I have shown, the sureties not 
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only consented to the said orders and act, but solicited and 
obtained them for their special relief and accommodation; the 
executions having been lev·ied alone on their property, and 
their principal being insolvent.'' 
Gl.enn vs. Morgan, 23 W. ,Va. 467. 
'' E executes a negotiable note to S. and M. and they, for his 
accommodation, indorse the same, which note E. sells to R .. 
for a loan of money. When the note falls due, S. and M. re-
quest R. to bring suit, which he does aga-inst all three. A 
judg1nent is rendered against all without appearance or de-
fense. By agreement between E. and R., without the knowl-
edge or assent of S. and M., the said R. directs his counsel 
to enter on the record at the foot of the judgment, '·Execution 
stayed six months', which was done. It was held that this 
exonerates the said S. arid M. from liability on said judgment 
and that a court of equity will enjoin the said R. from en~ 
forcing said judgment against S. and M. '' Shields vs. Rey-
nolds, 9 W.Va. 483. · 
Dear·iso vs. First Nl~t. Bank, 68 S. E. 448 (Ga.) .. 
''Both the common law and under the express provisions 
of statute any act of the creditor, either before or after judg-
ment against the principal, which injures the surety; or in-
creases his risk, or exposes him to greater liability, will dis-
charge him.'' 
·It will be remembered that the endorser, Barrett, claims 
discharge because of extensions of time made both before and 
after the judgment was obtained. Thus far under "error No. 
6'' authorities have been cited specifically relating to the 
rights of surety for extensions made after judgment. The re-
maining authorities apply to the rights of sureties after judg-
ment ou account of extensions made before judgment. 
Armistead vs. Ward, 2 Pat. and H. 504 (1857). 
Evans executed his bond to Smith for $1,000.00 with two 
Armisteads and two Rusts as sureties. Smith assigned the 
bond to another Smith, who assigned it to the defendant, 
Ward. Evans paid Ward $40.00 on the bond with the agree-
ment tl1at Ward should wait with him until a certain date. 
Ward accepted the money and granted the indulgence. Evans 
did not pay at this extended time and obtained a second in-
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dulgence on paying $60.00. None of the sureties knew of 
these extensio:ns. Later Ward obtained j~dgment against 
sureties and issued execution which was levied upon their 
property. In 1841 the sureties filed their bill stating that they 
had no knowledge of the forbearance until after the judgment 
at law was obtained against them and pray~d for an injunc-
tion to restrain Ward from proceeding further on his judg-
ment. 
Held: 
"If the creditor in such case obtains a judgment at law 
against the suretiP.s, before they have notice of the contract 
for indulgence, the court of equity, on the application of the 
sureties, will perpetually enjoin the execution of the judg-
ment.'' 
Dey vs. Martin, 78 N'a. 1 (1883). 
The Mercantile Bank of Norfolk, of which Dey was re· 
ceiver, was the holder of the note on which ~Iartin was en-
dorser. . The note 'vas protested and suit instituted. During 
the pendency of the suit the maker paid the Bank $114.59, a 
portion of the note and the Bank agreed to extend the time of 
the payment of the remainder until March l~th. At the same 
time the Bank held another note for over $1,900.00 against the 
same parties in the same capacity. Upon default being made, 
suit was brought on both notes. When the case was tried it 
was discovered that the larger note had been paid and a 
judgment 'vas entered on the smaller one. At that time the 
endorser knew nothing of the dismissal of the first suit, the 
partial payment a.nd the extension of time granted by the 
Bank. The following year the endorser gavie a deed of trust 
on his property in Norfolk to secure the d~bt and the bank 
agreed to release the lien of the judgment on the balance of 
his property. Later the property under the trust deed was 
advertised for sale and the endorser obtained an injunction. 
"There is no doubt that, by the indulgence granted the 
maker of the note, the appellee as endorser thereon was dis-
charged. An endorser of a note is a surety for the maker; 
and the doctrine is well established that any change in the con-
tract, however immaterial, and even although it be for his ad-
vantage, discharges the surety, if made without his consent.,., 
In some jurisdictions mere indulgence of the principal 
debtor by the creditor discharges the surety, and likewise 
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some courts have held that a restoration of the property to 
the principal debtor after it had been levied on releases the 
surety.. These questions have arisen in Virginia in numerous 
cases after judgment against both the principal debtor and 
surety, but our courts have held that mere indulgence of the 
creditor to the debtor, which does not extend to a definite date, 
or the restoration of the property levied on, does not dis .. 
charge the surety. The discharge, however, has never beeJJ 
denied on the ground that there is a merger of the rights of 
the parties after judgment and that the relationship of prin-
cipal and surety has ceased to exist in equity. And so far 
as I have been able to learn, no such claim has ever been made 
on behalf of the creditor. 
CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons above set forth, your petitioner submits 
that the Trial Court erred in its decree herein complained 
of and that it should have held that the respondent, H. A . 
. Barrett, was discharged form any and all liability on account 
of said bond and/or judgment, should have perpetually en-
joined the enforce1nent of said judg·ment against the said H. 
A. Barrett; should have decreed that said judgment and any 
~xecution issued thereon does not constitute a lien on the prop-
erty of said H. A. Barrett, and the said judgment marked 
satisfied as to H. A. Barrett on the records of the Clerk's Of-
fice of the Circuit Court of Southampton County, Virginia. 
PRAYER. 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that an appeal and super-
sedeas may be granted him to the decree aforesaid, and that 
the said decree may be reviewed and reversed, and such a 
decree entered here as the Trial Court ought to have entered. 
And your petitioner will adopt this petition as his open-
ing brief on the hearing of this case in the. Supreme Court of 
'Appeals of Virginia. 
Your petitioner desires to state orally the reasons for re-- · 
. viewing the decree complained of. · 
A copy of this petition 'vas delivered to counsel for the 
appellee on October lOth, 1933. · 
· H. A. BARRETT, 
By JUNIUS W. PULL·EY, 
His counsel. 
JUNIUS W. PULLEY, p. q. 
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'·I, James ·r. Gillette, Attorney, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of .Virginia, do hereby ~ertify that in my 
opinion the decree complained of in the foregoing petition is 
erroneous and should be reviewed and reversed, and such a 
decree entered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
l1erein as is indicated in the petition above. 
Given under my hand this lOth day .of October, 1933. 
JAS. T. GILLETTE. 
Received Oct. 12, 1933. 
}.II. B. WATTS, Clerk_ 
Novemher 23, 1933. Appeal a.warded by the Court. Bond, 
$500.00. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Southampton County at 
the Court House thereof, on the 3rd day of August, 1933. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: At rules held 
. in the Clerk's Office of the said Court, on the 26th day of 
December, 1932, came Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a Cor-
. poration, by their counsel, and filed its bill in Chancery against 
. Thomas H. Barrett, et als., which said bill is in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: 
page 1 } Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. In 
Chancery. 
· Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Thon1as H. Barrett and Mark E. Barrett, individually and ·as 
partners trading as Barrett & Brother, Lina M. B~rrett 
(~Irs. ~lark E. ;Barrett), Effa ~I. Barrett (~Irs. Thomas 
H. Barrett), Hugh A. Barrett, J. T. Barham, Trustee, S. 
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P. Winbo~ne, Administrator of estate of J. 0. Battle, de-
ceased, Stanley Winborne, Trustee, S. P. Winborne, Marvin 
D. White, Trustee, J. W. Perry & Company, a corporation, 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, a corporation, Rich-
ard Howard, Trustee, George T. Caroon, Alvah Early, 
Trustee, Farmers Atlantic Bank of Ahoskie, a corporation, 
R. E. L. Watkins, Trustee, Fannie E. Bristow, Pearl Barrett 
(~frs. Hugh A. Barrett), ~L E. Barrett, Trustee, (Mrs.) El-
mer Britt, J. T. iBryant, W. T. Smith and J. T. Story, indi-
vidually and as partners trading as Statesville Ginning 
Company, R. F. Boyette, G. R. Fowler, Trustee, Henry E. 
Bailey, Trustee, Merchants & Farmers Bank of Franklin, 
a corporation, John M. Britt, Trustee, Lou D. Channing 
(Mrs. L. D. Channing), M. J. White, Trustee, J. W. Brown, 
Nannie E. Rawls (Mrs. Uriah Rawls), J. B. Barnes, J. W. 
Holland and W. T. Oberry, Defendants. 
BILL. 
To the Honorable James L. McLemore, Judge of the Cir-
cuit Court of Southampton County, Virg·inia : 
Your p1aintiff, Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corpora-
tion org·anized and existing under. the laws of the State of 
:Virginia, shows unto the court the following case: 
· 1. On the 1st day of May, 1922, a judgment was recovered 
in the Clerk's Offiee of this Court in favor of Vaughan and 
Company, Bankers, against Barrett & Brother, which is a part-
nership composed of Mark E. Barrett and Thomas H. Bar-
rett, and ag·ainst M. E. Barrett, individually, (who is Mark 
E. Barrett), and Lina Barrett, (who is Mrs. Mark E. Bar· 
rett), and T. H. Barrett, individually, (who is Thomas H. Bar-
rett), and Effa Barrett (who is Mrs. Thomas H. Barrett) and 
H. A. Barrett (who is Hugh A. Barrett), all of 
pag·e 2 ~ the County of Southampton, for the sum of 1.,wenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) with interest 
thereon from the 9th day of June, 1921, until paid, and 10% at-
torneys' feet in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) 
for costs of collection and Twenty-eight Dollars Seventy Cents 
($28.70) costs, homestead exemption waived; which said judg-
ment was duly docketed in the said Clerk's Office on the 1st 
day. of May, 1922, in Judgment Docket Book 6, page 21, an 
abstract of said judgment being herewith :filed marked Exhibit 
A and made a part of this bill. 
2; A writ of fieri facias was issued upon said judgment on 
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the 2nd day of 1\fay, 1922, directed to the sheriff of said county 
returnable at the 1st July Rules, 1922, and was placed in the 
.hands of said sheriff to be executed, and· was at said Rules 
returned by the said sheriff with the notation of ''no effects''; 
and another writ of fieri facias 'vas issued upon said judgment 
to the said sheriff on the 2nd day of November, 1932, return-
·able at the .1st January Rules, 1933, and was placed in the 
hands of said sheriff to be executed. 
3. The said judgment is now owned and held by the plaintiff 
.in this suit. 
4. Interest 'vas paid on said judgment to February 28, 1924, 
and certain payments have been made on the principal, leaving 
a. balance now due the plaintiff of Fifteen Thousand Four 
Hundred Three Dollars Twenty-two Cents ($I5,403.22) with 
interest from December 19, 1932, and 10% attorney's fee in the 
·sum of T'vo Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) for costs of col-
lection, together with the original costs of Twenty-eight Dol-
lars Seventy Cents ( $28.70) and all subsequent costs thereon. 
5. The said judgment is a lien on the following real estate, 
all in Southampton County, of or to which the defendants in 
said judgment are possessed or entitled in fee-simple; the de-
scription of all items to be taken as including all improvements 
and appurtenances thereon or thereunto belonging: 
ITEM ONE: That certain tract of land containing 
·page 3 } eighty-five (85) acres, more or less, in Newsoms 
Magisterial District, known as the White land and 
. a part of the estate of Mrs. S. E. Darden, being bounded by 
John Everett, Joe Urquhart and Frank Urquhart, having been 
purchased by the late James J. Darden from H. D. White. 
This item was conveyed to T. H. Barrett by deed from E. 
~L Darden and others recorded in the said Clerk's Office in 
Deed Book 48, page 723, and ag·ainst this item there appear to 
be liens on t~ records of said Clerk's Office as follows, in 
addition to the lien of the plaintiff's judgment hereinabov~ 
referred to and other judgments against the owners of said 
real estate: 






(b) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and wife to J. T. 
Barham, Trustee, dated July 19, 1920, recorded August 28, 
1920~ in Trust Deed Book 20, page 451, securing a bond of $2,~ 
000.00 to J. 0. Battle, now held by S. P. Winborne, Adminis-
trator of J. 0. Battle's estate. 
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(c) Deed of Trust from T. H. Barrett and wife to Stanley 
Winborne, Trustee, dated March 21, 1922, recorded April 13 .. 
19'22, in Trust Deed Book 22, page 175, securing a bond of $2,-
500.00 to S. P. Winborne. · 
ITEl\f TWO: That certain tract or parcel of land in New-
. soms A1:agisterial District lmown as the Glover land and for· 
merly a part of the Carr tract, contain:ng· sixty-two and one-
half ( 62V2 ) acres, bounded by lands f orn1erly belonging to lt. 
S. Majette, 1frs. Charles Bryant, :Nirs. Cornelia Hart and 
others, and be:.ng· the separate maiden property of Annie 1\L 
Glover, 'vho was formerly Annie lt Bryant. 
This item was conveyed toT. H. Barrett by deed from An-
·nie 1\f. Glover dated February 8, 1909, recorded July 19, 1909, 
in the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 53, page 493, and 
against this item there appear to be liens on the records of 
·said Clerk's Office as follows, in addition to the lien of the 
·plaintiff's judgment hereinabove referred to and other judg-
·ments against the owners of said real estate: 






(e) Deed of trust from Thomas H. Barrett and wife to J. 
T. Barham, Trustee, dated· July 19, 1920, recorded August 28, 
· 1920, in Trust Deed Book 20, page 451, securing a bond of $2,-
000.00 to J. 0. Battle, now held by S. P. Winborne, Adminis-
trator of J. 0. Battle's estate. 
(f) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and wife to 
page 4 r .Stanley Winborne, Trustee, dated 1\{arch 21, 1922, 
recorded April 13, 1922, in Trust Deed Book 22, 
page 175, securing a bond of $2,500.00 to S. P .• Winborne. 
ITEl\'I THREE : That a certain tract or parcel of land in 
Newsom ~{ag·isterial District containing three hundred :fifty-
two ( 352) acres, more or less, known as the R. S. Majette hom~ 
place, together with a store lot adjoining the same containing 
one (1) acre, more or less, the 'vhole being bounded by the 
Virginia-North Carolina State line and the lands of Elma · 
Brett, Hugh A. Barrett and others. 
A one-ha!f (1;2) undivided interest in this item is said to 
have descended to Effa 1I. Barrett, and the other one-half 
(%) undivided interest was conveyed to T: H. Barrett by 
deed from E. S. l\1:ajette and wife dated January 1, 1908, re-
. corded November 24, 1908, in the said Clerk's Office in Deed 
Book 53, pag·e 209, and against this item there appear to ·~e 
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liens on the records ·of said Clerk's Office as follows, in addi-
tion ·to the lien of the plSlintiff's judgment hereinabove re-
ferred to and other judgments against the owners of said 
real estate: 






(h) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and others to Marvin 
D. White, Trustee, dated October 11, 1927, recorded March 
13, 1928, in Trust Deed Book 28, page 12, securing four ( 4) 
notes for $25,513.09 to ,T. W. Perry & Company. 
( i) Lease from T. H. Barrett to Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey dated February 10, 1931, recorded March 13, 1931. 
in Deed Book 72, page 169, leasing the Barrett & Brother store 
in State$ville, whi~h the plaintiff is advised is located on this 
property. 
I TEl\£ FOUR: That certain tract or parcel of land in New~ 
soms l\{agisterial District known as the old Norman Caroon 
place, containing one hundred fifty-two (152) acres, more or 
less, devised to George T. Caroon by his father. 
This item was conveyed to T. H. Barrett and l\1:. E. Bar-
rett by deed from George T. Caroon and wife dated January 
24,1919, recorded January 27, 1919, in the said Clerk's Office in 
Deed Book 61, page 301, and against this item there appear to 
be liens on the records of said Clerk's Office as follows, in ad-
dition to the lien of the plaintiff's judgment hereinabove re-
ferred to and other judgments against the owners of said real 
estate: 






(k) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and wife and M. E. 
Barrett and wife to Richard Howard, Trustee, dated January 
24, 1919, recorded January 27, 1919, in Trust Deed Book 18, 
page 514, securing a bond of $15,187.50 to George T. Caroon. 
( 1) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and others to Marvin 
D. White, Trustee, dated October 11, 1927, recorded March 
13, 1928, in Trust Deed Book 28, page 12, securing four (4) 
notes for $25,513.09 to J. W. Perry & Company. 
(m) Deed of trust from T. H. Barrett and l\L E. Barrett to 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of ;Virginia. 
Alvah Early, Trustee, dated February 1, 1928, recorded May 
24, 1928, in Trust Deed Book 28, page 137, securing note of 
$6,000.00 to Farn1ers Atlantic Bank of Ahoskie, North Caro-
lina. · 
ITE~f FIVE: That certain tract or parcel of land in New-
sonls ~fag·isterial District, containing one hundred thirty (130) 
acres, more or less, known as a part of the Tl!omas Everett 
place purchased by Vasseline Carter from W. T. Carter, 
·bounded by the lands of Mrs. 1\L F. Barrett, W. V. Simmons. 
J. N. Caroon and R. S. 1\tiajette. 
This item was conveyed to 1\L E. Barrett and Lina M. Bar-
rett by deed from Va.sseline C. Carter and W. T. Carter, her 
husband, dated December 30, 1.902, recorded January 5, 1903, 
in the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 48, page 127, and 
against this item there appear to be liens on the records of 
the said Clerk's Office as follows, in addition to the lien of 
the plaintiff's judgment hereinabove referred to and other 
judgments against the owners of said real estate: 










( o) Deed of trust from 1\L E. Barrett and Lina M. Barrett 
toR. E. L. Watkins, Trustee, dated December 7,1920, recorded 
January 28, 1921, in Trus.t Deed 'Book 21, page 130, securing 
a bond of $1,500.00 to Stella 1\ti. Beale and a bond or $2,500.00 
to Bernie~ Beale Herrin, both of which bonds are now held 
by Fannie E. "Bristow. 
( p) Deed of trust from M. E. Barrett and others to Mar-
vin D. White, trustee, dated October 11, 1927, recorded 1\tiarch 
13, 1928, in Trust Deed Book 28, page 12, securing four ( 4) 
notes for $25,513.09 to J. W. Perry & Company. 
ITEM SIX: A one-half (lh) undivided interest 
·page 6 ~ in that certain tract or parcel of land in Boy kin 'g 
Magisterial District, containing two hundred tw.elve 
and one-fourth (2121;4) acres, nwre or less, known as a part 
of the George Darden old home place.· 
This item v1as conveyed to Hugh A. Barrett by deed from 
Mrs. P. J. Darden dated March 12, 1915, recorded March 151 
1915, in the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 57, page 500. 
There seem to be no liens of record against this property ex-
cept 1932 taxes and the plaintiffs judgment. 
----- ----~ 
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ITE~I SEVEN: That certain tract or· parcel of land in 
Newsoms .Magisterial District, containing ninety-six (96) 
acres, more or less, being known as a part of the Mrs. M. F. 
Barrett home place, bounded north by the public road leading 
from Newsoms to Caroon 's store, east by T. H. Barrett and 
wife, south by the Virginia-North Carolina State Line, and 
west by N annie L. Barrett. _ 
· This item (plus five acres which was later conveyed toW. 
T. Smith) was conveyed to Hugh A. Barrett by deed from 
1Irs. l\L F. Barrett dated Aug·ust 1, 1913, recorded August 18, 
1913, in the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book .56, -page 247. 
There seem to be no liens of record against this property ex-
cept 1932 taxes amounting to $45.15 and the plaintiff's judg-
mP.nt. 
ITEJ\1: EIGHT: Tl1at certain tract or parcel of land in 
Newsoms magisterial District, containing one hundred thirty-
'five (135) acr-es, more or less, being a part of what was known 
as the ~Iartha L. and R. L. Bryant farm, bounded by the lands 
of C. R. Everett, Lee Barnes, R. T. Barnes, T. H. Barrett, 
J. G. Railey and the estate of S. B. Bryant. 
This item was conveyed to Hugh A. Barrett by deed from S. 
B. Bryant dated January 1, 1919, recorded August 8, 1919, 
jn the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 62, page 18, and against 
this item there appear to be liens on the records of said 
Clerk's Office as follows, in addition to the lien of the plain-
tiff's judgment hereinabove referred to and other judgments 
ag·ainst the owner of said real estate: · 
( q) 1932 taxes $25.05 
( r) Deed _of trust from H. A. Barrett and wife to M. E. 
Barrett, trustee, dated January 1, 1919, recorded .August 8, 
1919, in Trust Deed Book 19, page 331, securing bond for 
$3,000.00 to S. B. Bryant, which bond is now held by (Mrs.) 
Elmer Britt. 
ITEJ\1: NINE : One g·in house, together with all improve-
ments and appurtenances therein or thereunto belonging. 
This item is located on either a part ·of Item Seven above 
or Item 10 below, but is here listed separately for 
pag·e 7 ~ convenience on account of the fact that it is sepa-
rately listed in the name of Thomas H. Barrett and 
M. E. Barrett on the Land Books of this county. The plain-
tiffs is advised that the lease from Hugh A. Barrett to J. T. 
Bryant herein below mentioned under Item Ten, covering a 
. portion of Item Ten, has been assigned to and is now owned 
. by Thomas H. Barrett and Mark E. Barrett, but no such as-
signment appears on record. 
6. ·The said judgment is also a lien upon the following real 
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estate in Southampton County, of or to which the defendants 
in said judgment were or become possessed or entitled, at or 
·after the date of said judgment, and which, since the date of 
said judgment and subject to the lien of same, have beeh con-
veyed by the said defendants to other persons, the descrip-
-tion .of all items to be taken as including all improvements and 
appurtenances thereon or thereunto belonging: 
· ITE~I TEN : That certain tract or parcel of land in New-
·soms Magisterial District, containing three ( 3) acres, more 
·or· less, being· a part of the old Richard Bar:rett farm and 
-bounded as follows: beginning at a wire fence post on the 
road leading frmn the Newsoms and 1\furfreesboro road to 
the county road leading from Como to Boone's Bridge, as the 
same ran in 1922, and running in an easterly direction along 
the wire fence, dividing line for this tract and the lands of 
T. H. Barrett and Effa Barrett,. to a point on the county road 
leading from Newsoms to 1\Iurfreesboro; thence along the said 
county road in a northwesterly direction to the lands (in 
1922) of W. T. Smith; thence in a southwesterly direction 
along the said W. T. Smith old line to the point of beginning. 
This item is a pal~t of the land which was conveyed to Hugh 
A. Barrett by deed from Mrs. M. F. Barrett dated August 1, 
1913, recorded August 18, 1913, in the said Clerk's Office in 
'Deed Book 56, page 247; and this item was conveyed toW. T. 
Smith by Hugh A. Barrett and wife by deed dated November 
~0, 1922, ·recorded December 29, 1922, in the said Clerk's Of-
fice in Deed Book 65, page 68 ; and prior thereto was leased 
_by Hugh A. Barrett to J. T. Bryant by deed dated August 
·-, 1917, recorded April 20, 1918, in the said Clerk's Office 
in Deed Book 60, page 416; which conveyances however were 
subject to the lien of the said judgment. And the present 
owners of the said property, according to the records 
page 8 ~ in the said Clerk's Office, appear to be W. T. Smith 
· and J. T. Story, individually and -as partners trading 
as Statesville Ginning Company, and R. F. Boyette. And 
against this item there appear to be liens on the records of the 
said Clerk's Office as follows: 
( s) 1932 taxes $1.22 
(t) Deed of trust from W. T. Smith and wife to G. R. Fow-
ler, Tr~stce, dated April 28, 1925, recorded May 1, 1925, in 
· Trust Deed Book 24, page 467, securing bond for $5,213.66 to 
J. T. Story. · 
( u) Deed of trust from J. T. Story and wife to I!enry E. 
Bailey Trustee, dated A.pril16, 1930, recorded ·April18, 1930; 
in Trust Deed Book 29, page 456, securing bond for $2,250.00 
to Bank of Newsoms, which bond is now held by the Mer-
chants & Farm·ers Bank of Franklin, a corporation. 
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(v) Deed of trust from R. F. Boyette and wife to John M. · 
Britt, Trustee, dated January 2, 1931, recorded January 2, 
1931, in Trust Deed Book 30, page 109, securing bond for 
·$4,200 to Mrs. Lou D. Channing. 
ITEM ELEVEN: That certain tract or parcel of land in 
Newsoms Magisterial District, containing three ( 3) acres, 
more or less, being part of the R. S. Majette land, and being 
bounded on the north by the lands of H. A. Barrett, on the 
east by the county road from Statesville to Boone's Bridge, 
and on the south by the lands of (J\1rs.) Elma Brett. 
This item was a part of the R. S. Majette home place, Item 
Three above, and was conveyed to R. F. Boyette by deed 
·from T. H. Barrett and Effa Barrett dated August 20, 1925, 
·recorded January 11, 1926, in the said Clerk's Office in Deed 
Book 67, page 575. 
ITEl\1: TWELVE: A one-fifth (1/5) undivided interest in 
that certai:r;t tract or parcel of land in Newsoms l\tiagisterial 
District, containing one hundred forty-four (144) acres, more 
or less, known as the J. L. Modlin tract, lying on the public 
road from Sunbeam to Riverdale, and bounded on the west 
by Ed Edwards. 
This item was· conveyed to ~I. E. Barrett by deed fron1 
.J. L~ Modlin and wife dated January 1, 1919, recorded May 10, 
1919, in the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 61, page 503, and 
·was conveyed by the said M. E. Barrett to Helen R. Barnes 
·by deed dated January 1, 1922, recorded January 16, 1924, in 
the said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 65, page 570, which con-
veyance however was subject to the lien of. the said judgment. 
And this property appears on the records in the Clerk's Office 
to be owned by J. Walter Brown and ,John W .. Hol-
vage 9 ~ land, subject to no lie.ns, except the plaintiff's judg-
ment and 1932 taxes amounting to $7.07. · 
7. The rents and profits· of the said real estate will not 
~atisfy the said judgment in five ( 5) years. 
In cous:deration whereof, and forasmuch as the plaintiff is 
without remedy save in a court of equity, the plaintiff prays 
that the said Thomas If. Barrett and Mark E. Barrett, indi-
vidual!y and as partners trading as Barrett & Brother, Lina 
~I. Barrett (l\irs. Mark E. Barrett), Effa ·l\L Barrett (~Irs. 
'fhomas H;. Barrett), Hugh A. Barrett, J. T. Barham, Trustee, 
S. P. Winborne, Administrator of estate of J. 0. Battle, de-
ceased, Stanley Winborne, Trustee, S. P. Winborne, Marvin 
D. White, Trustee, J. W. Perry & Company, a corporation, 
Standard Oil Company of Ne'v Jersey, a corporation, Rich-
. ard How-ard, Trustee, George T. Caroon, Alvah Early, Trus-
tee, Farmers Atlantic Bank of Ahoskie, a corporation, R. E. 
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L. Watkins, Trustee, Fannie E. Bristow, Pearl Barrett (Mrs. 
Hugh A. Barrett), M. E. Barrett, Trustee, (Mrs.) Elmer 
Britt, J. T. Bryant, W. T. Smith and J. T. Story, individ~ally 
and as partners trading as Statesville Ginning Company, R. 
F. Boyette, G. R. Fowler, Trustee, Henry E. Bailey, Trustee, 
1\ferchants & Farmers Bank of Franklin, a corporation, J ohu 
NI. Britt, Trustee, Lou D. Channing (Nirs. L. D. Channing), l\L 
J. White, Trustee, J. W. Brown, Nannie E. Rawls (l\tlrs. Uriah 
Rawls), J. B. Barnes, J. W. Holland and W. T. Oberry may 
be made parties defendant to this bill and required to answer 
same, but not under oath, oath being hereby waived; that all 
proper orders and decrees may be, made, inquiries directed 
and accounts taken; that the priorities and amounts of the 
liens against said real estate, including the lien of the plain-
tiff's judgment, be established; that if it appears that the 
rents and profits of the said real estate will not satisfy the 
plaintiff's judgment in five ( 5) years, the said real estate, or 
so much thereof as may be necessary, be sold to satisfy the 
plaintif-f's judg·ment, together with all costs thereon 
page 10 }- and together with a fee for the plaintiff's attor-
ney, notice being hereby given that allowance of 
such fee wiH be requested; that if the rents and profits of 
the said real estate will. satisfy the judgment in five ( 5) years 
the said real estate be rented out ant the rents and profits 
thereon be applied to the said judgment and costs and fee un-
til the same are fully satisfied; and that the plaintiff may 
have all such further and general relief as the case may re-
quire or to equity Inay seem meet. 
And the plaintiff will forever pray, etc. 
V AUGHA~ & COMPANY, BANKERS, 
By C. C. V AUG :HAN, 3rd, President. 
JOHN C. P ARI<:ER, JR., 
Counsel for plaintiff. 
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Commonwealth of ;virginia, 
In Southampton Circuit Court, Clerk's Office, l\fay 1st. 
1922. 
Vaughan and Company, Bankers, Plaintiff, 
against 
Barrett & Bro., M. E. Barrett, Lina Barrett, T. H. Barrett, 
. Effa Barrett and H. A. Barrett, Defendants. 
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In debt. 
Judgment for the Plaintiff-against the Defendants for 
Twenty Thousand ......................... 00/100 Dollars, 
Homestead waived, with legal interest thereon from 9th day 
of June, 1921, till paid, together with 10% atty's fee in the 
sum of $2,000.00 for costs of collection. 
and costs $28.70 
An Abstract-Teste 
H. B. McLEMORE, C. C. 
By: B. M. WILLS, D. C. 
EXHIBIT A. 
Executions-
1922-11ay 2d-Cir. Ct. Sheriff 1922-lst July Rules-No ef-
f.ects-
1932-N ov. 2d-Cir. Ct. Sheriff 
Garnishee-Southampton 
& $5.00-1933-lst Jan. Rules. 
Nansemond 
Return day of Garnishee-Nov. 25, 1932. 
Paid in on Garnisment $31.86 credited this 19th day of 
Dec. 1932. 
Vaughan & Company 
vs. 
Barrett & Bro., et als. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. q. 
Abstract of Judgment 
Clerk's Office 
Circuit Court 
May 1st, 1922 
Doc. No. 6-Page 21. 
page 12 } And at ano(her day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 10th day of Feb· 
ruary, 1933. 
In the Circuit Court or Southampton County, Virginia. 
:Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a Corporation) 
vs. 
Thomas H. Barrett et als. 
. ;.. 
1 
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DECREE. 
This day came H. A. Barrett and asked leave to file his an-
swer and cross-bill in this cause; l-eave is grant~d and the 
said ~swer and cross-bill is accordingly filed. 
page 13 ~ And at -this same day, to-wit: In th~ Circuit 
Court of Southampton County, on the lOth day of 
February, 1933. 
In the ·Circuit Court of Southampton County, Virginia. 
iV aug han & Company, Bankers, a Corporation, 
vs. 
Thomas H. Barrett et als. 
ANSWER AND CROSS-BILL OF H. A. BARRETT. 
To the Honorable James L. McLemore, Judge of the said 
Court. 
. This respondent, H. A. Barrett, for ·answer to th-e bill of 
·complaint filed against him and others ·by V ~ugh an & Com-
pany, Bankers, in the Circuit Court of Southampton County, 
Virginia, or to so much thereof as he deems it material he 
should answer,. answers and._ says: 
1. This respondent denies that there is any legal binding 
judgment which-is binding- against him or his estate as set-
forth in Paragraph 1 of· complainant's bill; he stat-es that said 
judgment is null and void and of no effect and that any and all 
executions issued thereon are likewise null and void and of 
n.o effect and that neither said pretended judgment nor pr-e-
tended executions mentioned in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of com-
plainant 's· bill are now or ever have been ~jnding li-ens against 
any property ·belong·ing to this· respondent and he further 
denies that he is indebted to the said complainant for the 
sum of money or any portion th-ereof mentioned in said Para-
gTaph 1. He tl1erefore requires . strict proof of each and 
-every allegation made in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Complain-
ant's bill. . 
2. He denies the all-egations made in Paragraph 3 and re-· 
quires strict proof of same. 
3. This respondent is not advised as to any payments made 
on this alleged judgment as stated in Paragraph 4 and rc-
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quires strict proof of same. He states how-ever, that he has 
never paid anything on said alleg·ed judgment. 
4. This respondent further states that he has no interest 
whatever in the tracts of land number-ed Items One, Two, 
Three, Four, and Five nor in any of the alleged liens binding 
same. 
He has a % undivided fee-simple interest in the 
pag-e 14 ~ 212lj2 acres mentioned in Item 6 and that all state-
ments n1ade in connection with said item ar-e true 
except he denies that the aHeged judgment of plaintiff con-
stitutes a lien on said land. . 
· He is also the fee-sin1ple owner of the land mentioned un-
der Item 7 containing 96 acres, but he denies that the plain-
tiff's alleged judgment constitutes any lien binding said land. 
lie is the owner in fee-simple of the 135 acres n1entioned 
in Item 8 of complainant's bill and he admits that the liens 
thereon are as stated by complainant except he denies that 
plaintiff's alleged judgmen-t constitutes any lien against said 
real estate. 
He states that he has no interest whatever in the property 
mentioned in Itcn1s Nine, Ten, Eleven and Twelve. 
5. This respondent den:.es all allegations made in It-em 7 
of complainant's bill and require strict proof of same. 
6. For further answer to said bill this respondent states : 
That on ,June 9, 1921, Barrett & Brother, a partnership com-
posed of T. If .. Barrett and 1\II. E. Barrett, executed a certain 
·bond for the su1n of $20,000.00 payable on demand to the order 
· of Vaughan & Con1pany, Bankers, 'vhich said bond was en-
dorsed by 1\L E. Barrett, Lina Barr-ett, T. H. Barrett, Effa 
Barrett and H. A. Barret, a copy of which is herewith filed 
marked Exhibit D-1 and prayed to be read as a part .of this 
answer; that at the tilne of the execution of said bond this 
respondent becam-e the accommodation endorser thereon at 
"the request of the said obligee and with the assurance that no 
responsibility of any kind should attach to l1im unless and un-
til all rights and re1nedies of the holder of said bond should 
have been exhausted in an effort to collect san1e from the 
.makers and prior endorsers; that this respondent was induced 
to endors·e said bond with the understanding as above set 
forth, which said understanding was agreed to, as aforesaid, 
by said oblig~e; that C. C. Vaughan, Jr., who appears to have 
confessed the alleged judgment had· no authority 
·page 15 ~ whatever from this respondent authorizing and 
· en1powering him to confess the said judgment and 
. any attempted conf-ession of judgment by the said C. C . 
. ·vaughan,_ Jr., against this respondent is null and void and of 
no effect. 
34 Supreme Court of Appeals of N'irginia. 
This respondent further alleges that this said judgment 
is null and void and of no effect as to him and his property 
for the further reason that he, between the date of the execu-
tion of said bond on June 9, 1921 and the alleged·confession of 
judg·ment on May 1, 1922, was fully released from the payment 
of said bond or any portion thereof under and by virtue of a 
valid and binding agreement made between the holders of said 
bond and the makers extending· the time of payment of said 
bond to a definite period, which said extension was not as-
sented to by this respondent who, as above stated, was a party 
secondarily liable as accommodation endorser on said bond. 
This respondent further alleges that even though said 
judg·ment was properly confessed and did, at the time of the 
alleged confession, constitute a debt and a lien against this 
respondent and his property that nevertheless, this respond-
ent has been since released and discharged from any and all 
lia~ility on account of said judgment, for the reason that on 
numerous occasions and especially when payments were made 
on said indebtedness by the principal obligors the said obli-
g·ee agreed with said obligors for valuable consideration to 
extend the time of the payment of said debt (judgment) until 
a definite period in the future, all of which said binding ex-
tensions were unknown to this respondent at the time they 
were made and none of which were ever assented to by him; 
that in addition to the said extension the said obligors, al-
leged judgment creditors,. on the - day of , 1930, 
agreed with the obligors to extend the time of the payment of 
said alleged judgment debt until November 1, 1931, in the· 
event the said ob~igors should have a life insurance policy for 
the sum of $~5,000.00 on the life of T. H. Barrett executed 
and delivered to said obligees (alleged judgment 
page 16 }- creditors), which said extensions of time were 
unknown to this respondent and not assented to by 
him; that said policy was executed and delivered as agreed 
to said Vaughan & Company, Bankers, and accepted by 
them. : · 
This respondent further alleged that at the time of the 
aPeged confession of judgment for many years thereafter, 
in fact up to the year 1930, the obligors in said boud wer~ 
fu~ly able to pay said alleged debt and if the said obligot·s 
had used due diligence in the collection of said debt, said debt 
would have been paid in full by the parties primarily liable 
therefor; that at the time of the execution of said bond it was 
understood and ag-reed between the obligors and all parties 
primarily and secondarily liable therefor that the said obli-
gees should use due diligence to collect said debt from the 
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oblig·ors and this respondent alleges that the failure to collect 
same from that source was due to the negligence of .the obli-
gees and in breach of their obligation to those secondarily 
liable and especially to this respondent and that for this rea-
son this respondent ought not to be required to pay anything 
on account of said alleged debt or judgment. 
This respondent further states that on the 4th day of 
November, 1932, the alleged execution mentioned in Item Two 
of complainant's bill issued on November 2, 1932, was levied 
on numerous articles of personal property some of which be-
longed to T. H. Barrett, other to M. E. Barrett, Barrett Broth-
ers and in addition thereto said alleged execution was levied 
on said date on all personal property belonging to this re-
spondent ; the articles of personalty levied on as aforesaid and 
belonging to this respondent are as follows: 
421 bags peanuts, 50 barrels of co~n, 300 pounds cotton, 4 
shoats, 1 brood sow and 800 bundles fodder. 
That several other articles of personal property were levied 
on at said time by said Sheriff which were listed by him as be-
long:ng to this respondent, but this respondent alleges that 
all of said articles of personalty are the property of his wife, 
Mary Pearl Barrett, and are more particularly 
page 17 } described as follows : 
1 double horse wagon, 1 cart and wheels, 1 Everett Peanut 
Planter 1 Our Best Guano Sower, 1 mule named Ida (mare 
mule), 35 shoats (white & black), 3 sows white and black 
spotted and listed, 12 small pigs, 8 .sheep, 8 geese, 7 turkeys, 
2 red and black Jersey cows, 2 yearlings, 1 black mule nam:ed 
:Niag, 1 bay mule named Kit, 1 gray horse named Dan, 1 sin-
gle wagon, 1 Ferguson cultivator, 1 John Deering. Mowing 
Machine, 1 Case stalkcutter, 1 wire stretcher, 1 double drag 
(1/2 to R. F. Boyett), 1 pea weeder, 2 turn plows, 2 cotton 
plo,vs, 2 cultivators, 1 Everett Peanut Planter, .1 Our Best 
Guano Sower, 1 cotton planter ( lh to R. F. Boyett), 3 sets 
harness gear, 1 Chevrolet Coach 1928 Model #4832370; 1-
three piece living room suit (dark), 3 roc;king chairs, 1 Stutz 
Piano. and stool, 1-9 by 12 rug, 2 small rugs, 1 Wilson heater, 
1 stove ·mat, 1 round center. table, 1 square center table, 1 
hall rack, 4 rocking chairs, 2 small rugs, 1lot hall matting, 1 
center table, ·1 bureau, 1 wash stand, 1 bowl and pitcher, 1 
congoleum rug 9 by 12, 1 bureau (oak), 1 wash stand (oak), 
1 bowl ·and pitcher, 2 rocking chairs, 2 straight chairs 
1 bureau (oak), 1 wash stand, 1 lot straw matting or rug 
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9 by 12, 2 small rugs, 1 congoleum rug 3 by 4;1 stove, 1 bowl 
-and pitcher1 1 chest, 1 hall rack, 1 lot congoleum matting in 
back hall, 1 side b_oard, 7 dining chairs, 1 book case, 1 congo-
leum n1g, 9 by 12, 3 small kitchen tables, 1 double barrel gun 
and 1 porch swing·, small dark table. 
This respondent further states that in the event the court 
should be of the opinion that he is still liable on said debt the 
said complainants ought to be required to exhaust all legal 
and equitable remedies against Barrett Brothers, M. E. Bar-
rett, Lina Barrett, T. ;H. Barrett and Effa Barrett before pro-
ceeding against this respondent, and in this connection this 
-respondent states that the Sheriff of Southampton County on 
the 4th day of November, 1932, levied the said execution 
'vhich was issued on November 2, 1932, on the following per-
sonal property belonging to T. H. Barrett, J\II. E. Barrett,. 
·Barrett Brothers, a partnership ·composed of the said T. I-I. 
Barrett and J\11. E. Barrett1 to-wit : 
BARRETT BROTHERS. 
2 Dillard Cotton Gins, 1 Dillard Cotton gin press, 1 con-
denser, 1 suction and complete all pipe, 1 - gin, 1 case 
Power Unit, 1-18" by 80" long, 2 lines of shafting, 18 pulleys 
or shaft, 10 sn1all belts 6", 1. fire extinguisher (large), 1 pair 
Fairbanks scales and 1 pair Platform Scales in yard. 
1\L E. BARRETT. 
1 Saw mill complete (Turner), 1 to~er edger, 1 McCor-
mick Deering Power unit, 1\tiodel 300 S #P1744, 1 carriage 
and track, 3 log wagons complete, 1 dust chain and conveyor, 
1 circle saw in shed, 1 mare mule (dark bay named Nellie), 
1 mare mule (black named Ellen), 1 mare mule (dark bay 
named Lizzie), 1 horse mule (dark bay named George), 22 piles 
and racks of boards 2 by 4, 1 lot of vrood out sides at mill, 
1-1931 Chevrolet Coach #2258957, 1 dark bay horse mule 
named Di~l, 4 sets harness (wagon); 1 bookcase, 1 bureau, ·4 
· rocking.chairs, 4 small rugs, 1 wash stand, l,..g day 
page 18 ~ clock, 4 small rugs, 2 rocking chairs, 1· hall table, 
· 1 hall rack, 1 gas lamp, 1 small center table, ·1 
straight chair, 1-12 by 12 velvet rug, 1-l{ingsberry Piano arid 
stool, 3 small rugs, 5 rockers, 7 straight chairs, 1 center table 
'Oong), 3 small center tables, 2lamps, 5 small rugs, 1light oak 
hed and c~vering, 1 small center table, 1light oak wash stand, 
1 light oak bureau, 2 light oak rockers, 2 light oak straight 
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chairs, 1 Rayo Lamp (nickle), 1 bo,vl and pitcher, 4 small rug~ 
in hall, 1 old side board, 1 chiffonier, 1 dressing table, 1 white 
iron bed complete, 5 small rugs, 2 chairs (straight), 1 wash 
·stand, 1 bowl and pitcher, 2 straight chairs, 3 small rug·s, 4 
middle size rugs (3 by 6), 1 white iron bed and covering, 1 
bureau and bowl and pitcher, 1 wash stand, 1 stove, 1 lot of 
matting on floor, 1 dark oak bed complete, 3 small rugs, 1 
couch, 1 double barrel shot gun, 1 tall wardrobe, 1 side board, 
and contents, 1 work stand table, 1 china press and contents, 
1 refrigerator, 6 straight chairs, 1 congoleum rub 10 by 12, 
1 kitchen cabinet, 1 wash pot, 18 belt 60 feet long·, 2 log chains, 
3 small belts, 1 mouse colored mare rnule named Kate, 1 brown 
horse mule named John, 1 black horse mule named Tom, 1 
Hackney Wagon (double), 800 shocks peanuts, 50 barrels 
corn and 1,500 pounds cotton. 
T. H. BARRETT. 
1 Kreel Piano and stool, 1 writing· desk (roll top), 1 sew-
ing cabinet, 1 writing desk (old), 1 dining table and 2 ends, 
1 couch davenport (leather), 4 rocking chairs, 1 oval 8 day 
clock, 3 stnall congoleum rugs, 1 wardrobe, 1 chiffonier, 1 
dresser (dark), 2 rocking chairs, 1 straight chair, 1 Victrola, 
2 rocking chairs, 3 straight chairs, 1 hall rack, 1 grass mat, 
1 center table (large), 1 small center table, 1 large stone ern, 
1 -- mirror, 1 stand for umbrellas, 2 andi-irons (brass), 
2 small rugs, 1 dark bed and stead, 8 straight chairs, 1 arm 
chair, 2 rockers, 4 small rugs, 1 round center table, 1 oak wash 
stand, 1 oak commode, 1 center table, 1 oil lamp, 1 book case 
or stand, 1 rocker (cane bottom), 1 straight chair, (cane Bot-· 
tom), 1 bureau, 1 wash stand, 1 dark bed and stead, 1 mat, 9 
quEts and 1 mattress, 1 hammock, 1 straight chair, 1large oak 
bed and stead, 1 white iron bed and stead, 1 white bureau, 1 
light oak wardrobe, 1 stove and pipe, 1light oak wash stand, 
2 rocking chairs, 3 small mats, 1 straig·ht chair, 1 stove 1nat, 
2 sets bed covering, ( 6 quilts), 2 bowls and P.itchers, 1 lot 
bed clothing (7: quilts), 1 white iron bed, 3 bed quilts, 1 white 
bureau, 1 rocker, 2 straight chairs, 3 small rug·s, 1 old bureau 
(antique), 1 old antique bed (white), 1 rocking chair, 1 baby 
carriage, 1 small bureau, 1 small wash stand, 2 straight chairs, 
1 mattress, 2 ticks, 1 lot of 5 blankets, 2 old chests, 2 lots of 
ten quilts, 1 hall rack, 1 hall table, 3 congoleum rug·s, 1 straig·ht 
chair, 6 lamps, 1 china press and contents, 1-10 piece set sil-
ver ware, 1 lot chinaware, 1 drop leaf table, 1 china buffet, 
1 corner. -china press, 1 small table, 7 straight chairs, 1 congo-
leum rug, 9 by 12, 2 porch· rockers, 2 porch benches, 1 porch 
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table, 1 porch hammock; 1 Liverman Peanut Picker, 1 manure 
spreader, 1 John Deering Mowing ~iachine, 1 Int. Stalk Cut-
ter, 1-8 disc harrow, 1 hay rake, 1 Hosier Grain Drill, 1-1929 
~Iodel Chevrolet No. 1158310, 1 double drag, 2 guano sowers, 
1 Foster Cotton So,ver, 1 Ayers Peanut Planter, 1 Ferguson 
Cultivator, (1 row), 3 pieces roll wire, 1 block and fall, 2 bay 
horses, 2 bay horse mules, 1 bay mare mule, 2 black horse 
tnules,. 2 black mare mules, 1 gray mare, 1 double 'vagon, llow 
manure spreader, 500 feet of lumber, 30 barrels corn, 1 middle 
buster, 1,500 bundles fodder, 1,100 shock peanuts, 2 large sows, 
7 small pigs and 24 shoats, (black and white spotted), 153 
shocks peanuts, 290 shocks peanuts, 5 acres corn in field 
about 25 barrels, 1 mule named Nellie (black), 1 horse named 
Nancy (g-ray), 204 shocks peanuts Andrew Wynn gets one-
half share and 600 shocks peanuts and 100 barrels corn, 1 
tower edger, 1 saw mill carriage, 1 saw mill mouth 
page 19 ~ and shaft, 1 dust chain, 1 track complete, 3-6" belts 
(short), 6 racks of boards, 2 piles scantling, 1 pile 
of boards and 4 racks of lumber at old site. 
This respondent further alleges that he has been fully 
and completely released and discl1arged from any and all 
liability on account of said bond andjor judgment by virtue 
of the following facts: 
That on numerous occasions since the maturity of the 
alleged debt the -said principal debtors had on deposit in the 
possession of said plaintiff, the Bank, divers sums of money 
aggregating a sum far in excess of the amount at any time 
due and oweing on said judgment, which said sums of money 
the said plaintiff could and should have applied to the pay-
ment of the alleged debt, but which they failed to so apply 
to the payment of this judgment but permitted the said 
principal debtors to use said money for other purposes, the 
plaintiff well knowing at the time that this respondent 'vas 
secondarily liable, if liable at all, on said alleged debt. And 
further that. on or about the day of August, 1932, this 
respondent requested the said plaintiff to proceed at once 
to collect said debt by any and all legal available means, 
but that the said plaintiff failed to take any steps whatever 
to collect said debt until the 2nd day of September, 1932, 
when said execution was issued, at which time , 
, other creditors of the said prin-
cipal debtors had obtained a lien on all personal property 
belonging to said principal debtors under and by virtue of 
the issuance and placing in the hands of the Sheriff for exe-
cution of a certain fieri facias for the sum of $ · 
with interest thereon from the day of , 19 , 
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and_ $ cost, which said execution is now a subsisting 
and binding lien against all personal property of the prin-
cipal debtors and is prior to the lien of the complaina.nts .. 
(h) This re~pondent further alleges that the complainants 
have been at all times fully cognizant of the· fact that Barrett 
Brothers, T. H. Barrett and J\II. E. Barrett, were their prin-
cipal debtors and that this respondent was sec-
page 20 } ondarily liable as accommodation endorser and that 
he was responsible for no part of said debt save· 
.and except that portion of same which might remain.due and 
<Hoeing after the exhaustion of all rights and remedies per-
mitted in, law or in equity against the said principal debtors. 
This respondent further. alleges that he knew nothing of 
any of the above alleged extensions of time for the payment 
·of said debt or of any other matter above alleged as releasing 
.and discharging this respondent until on or about the 20th 
day of Janua1·y, 1933. 
In tender cons_ide·ration whereof, this respondent prays 
t}lat this answer may also be treated as a cross-bill; that 
Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, may be made 
parties defendant and required to answer same, though not 
under oath, the oath being hereby waived; that proper pro-
cess may issue, that the alleged judgment of Vaughan & 
Company, Bankers, against this respondent and others be 
forever released and discharged as against this respondent 
and his property; that the said Vaughan & Company, Bankers, 
may be permanently enjoined and restrained from in any 
way enforcing said judgment or assigning same; that said 
judgment niay be marked satisfied on the records in the 
Clerk's Office of your honor's court; that in the event the 
court should be of the opinion this respondent is in any 
way liable for said alleged judgment or any portion there-
. of then this re~pondent prays that the said complainants 
may be required to exhaust all legal and equitable remedies 
for the collection of said debt from T. H. Barrett, M. E. 
Barrett, Lina Barrett, Effa Barrett and Barrett Brother 
. before proceeding to enforce the collection of said debt from 
this respondent or his property; that this respondent may 
. have such other and .further relief in the premises as the 
nature of his case may require or to equity and good con-
science shall seem meet. 
And this respond~nt will ever pray, etc. 
JUNIUS W. PULLEY, 
Counsel. 
H . .A. BARRETT, 
Respondent. 
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page· 21 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 28th day of March, 
1933. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. 
Vaughan & Co~pany, Bankers, a corporation, 
vs. 
Thomas H. Barrett? et als: .. 
ORDER .. 
(. 
Th:Ls day this cause ·came on to be heard on the papers 
formerly read and on the replication of Vaughan & Company 
to the answer of H. A. Barrett and answer of Vaughan & · 
Company to the cross-bill of H. A. Barrett. 
Whereupon the said replication and answer is hereby filed. 
page 22 ~ And a.t this same day, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court of Southampton County, on the 28th day of 
March, 1933. 
Virginia.: 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. 
Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, • 
vs .. 
Thomas H. ~arrett, et als. 
REPLICATION OF PLAINTIFF TO ANSWER OF H. A. 
BARRETT, .A.ND ANSWER OF PLAINTIFF TO 
CROSS-BILL OF H. A. BARRETT. 
The plaintiff, Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, 
for replication to the answer and cross-bill of H. A. Barrett, 
one of the defendants herein, and for answer to said cross-
bill, says :. 
1. The plaintiff enters a general replication of facts and 
conclusions alleged in paragraph 1 of said answer and cross:.. 
bill. . . 
2. Referring to the sub-paragraphs under paragraph num-
bered 6 of said answer and cross-bill, which sub-paragraphs 
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the. plaintiff has for convenience designated as (a) to (i) in-
Clusive: 
.As to paragraph 6 (a) the plaintiff admits the date, amount, 
makers, :endorsers and maturity of the note as alleged in said 
paragraph but enters a general replication as to all other 
facts and as to all conclusions set out in the said paragraph; 
and the plaintiff says that even if the facts alleged in said 
paragraph as follo-\vs, "that at the time of the execution of 
said bond this respondent became the accommodation en-
dorser thereon at the request of the said obligee and with 
the assurance that no responsibility of any kind attach to 
him unless and until all rights and remedies of the holder 
of said bond should .have been exhausted in an effort to col-
lect same from the makers and prior endorsers; that this 
respondent was induced to endorse said bond with the under-
standing as above set forth, which said understanding was 
agreed to, as aforesaid, by said obligee'' were true, 
page 23 ~ which is denied, the said facts would not be ad-
missible as evidence in this suit; and :the plaintiff 
therefore moves to strike that portion of the paragraph above 
quoted. 
3. As to paragraphs 6 (b) (c) (d) (g) {h)·and (i), the 
plaintiff enters a general replication to all facts and con-
clusions therein stated .. 
4. .As to paragraph 6 (e), the plaintiff enters a general 
replication to the allegation that certain articles therein listed 
are the property of lVIa.ry Pearl Barrett, and alleges on the 
contrary that the said articles are and were at the time 
of the levy thereon the property of the respondent H. A. 
Barrett. 
5. As to paragraph 6 (f), the plaintiff denies that there 
is any obligation on the plaintiff to exhaust all legal and 
equitable remedies against Barrett Brothers, lVI. E. Barret, 
Lin a Barrett, T. H. Barrett and E:ffa. Barrett before pro-
ceeding against the respondent H . .A. Barrett. . 
6. And the plaintiff· further says that the note upon which 
judgment was entered against the defendant H. A. Barret~ 
amd other defendants as stated in the plaintiff's bill, was 
given to the plaintiff as collateral security for the indebted-
ness of the said other defendants to the plaintiff, as evi-
denced by· other notes on which said other defendants were 
liable to the- plaintiff, and that the said judgment, from the 
moment of its entry. and docketing, was collateral security 
for said indebtedness, and that such extensions of ·tim:e as 
~were made were on said other notes, and not on said col-
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lateral note endorsed by the defendant H. A. Barrett nor 
on said judgment against him, and that such extensions of; 
time do not constitute a defense to the defendant H. A. Bar-
. rett. 
7. And the plaintiff further says that even if 
page 24 ~ the facts alleged as having taken place subsequent 
to the entry and docketing of said judgment were 
true, which is denied, said facts would not constitute a de-
fense to the defendant H. A. Barrett in this suit for the 
reason that the entry and docketing of said judgment merged 
the liability of all parties on the said note, and the liability 
of the said defendant H. A. Barrett and all other parties 
defendant became then and there fixed by said judgment, and 
the distinction between primary and secondary liability on. 
the said note, if _any existed prior to the entry and docketing 
of the said judgment, which is denied, was by said judgment 
wiped out, and after the entry and docketing of said judg-
ment all parties, including the defendant H. A. Barrett, were 
absolutely and primarily bound therefor; wherefore the plain.:. 
tiff moves to strike from the said answer and cross-bill the 
said paragraphs 6 (c), 6 (d) and 6 (g). 
8. And the plaintiff says that any and all extensions of time 
granted on ibe said principal indebtedness, and any and 
all alleged postponement by the plaintiff of the enforcement 
of its rights against the defendants on the said collateral 
note andjor judgment andjor principal notes, was with the 
full lmowledge and consent of the said defendant H. A. Bar-
rett. 
9. And the plaintiff further says that even if the facts 
alleged in paragraphs 6 (h) and 6 (i) were true, which is 
denied, the said facts would not be admissible as evidence 
in this suit; and the plaintiff therefore moves to strike the 
said paragraphs. 
10. As to all claims and contentions made in said answer 
and cross-bill concerning the alleged invalidity of said judg-
ment at the. time the same was confessed and docketed, and 
concerning any alleged release from liability on said judg-
ment or on the note on which said judgment is based on ac-
count of any facts or conditions arising prior to the 
page 25 ~ date of the death of C. C. Vaughan, Jr., who was 
the active head of Vaughan & Company, Bankers, 
to-wit, the 21st day of March, 1929, the defendant H. A. 
Barrett is guilty of laches, and said claims and contentions 
should not now be heard. · 
11. The plaintiff states that all claims of the defendant 
H. A. Barrett that he is secondarily and not primarily liable 
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on said note and judgment, and all his claims of release 
from liability on account of. extension of time to other de-
fendants, or on account of the alleged failure of plaintiff 
to prosecute its remedies against the other defendants or 
to collect from the other defendants, and all claims of the 
said defendant based on an alleged difference between his 
~iability and the liability of the other defen~ants on said 
note and judgment, ~vere waived by the said defendant in. the 
language of the note itself over his signature, to-wit: "We, 
the endorsers named below, waive presentment, protest; de-
mand of payment and notice of non-payment and gu~rantee 
the payment of the within note at maturity, or any time 
thereafter, and agree that all. the provisions therein shall 
apply to and bind us as though we W·ere makers. H. A. 
Barrett" as will more fully appear by copy of said note 
tiled with the said answer and cross-bill. 
12. In conclusion, the plaintiff denies that the respondent 
H. A. Barrett is entitled to any of the relief prayed for in 
his said answer and cross-bilL 
VAUGHAN & COMPANY, BANKERS, 
By:JOHN C. PARKER, JR., 
Attorney. 
March 28, 1933. 
JOHN C. PARKER, JR., 
Counsel for plaintiff. 
page 26 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 3rd day of Au-
gust, 1933. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. 
, I • .-
DECREE. 
Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, 
vs. . 
Thomas H. Barrett, et a1s. 
·This day this cause came on again to be heard on the 
papers formerly read, and on the answer and cross-bill of 
H. A. Barrett, filed on the lOth day of February, 1933, and 
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on ~the replication and answer of the plaintiff to said answer 
and cross-bill filed on the 28th day of March, 1933, and on 
the supplemental answer and cross-bill of H. A. Barrett this 
day filed, and on the replication and answer of the plaintiff 
to said supplemental answer and cross-bill this day :filed, and 
on the motion of the plaintiff to strike the said answer and 
cross-bill, and the said supplemental answer and cross-bill; 
and was argued by counsel. 
It appearing to the Court that the written contract of the. 
defendant, H. A. Barrett, to-wit, a note and endorsement 
thereon in the following words and :figures, to-wit: 
June 9th, 1921. 
$20,000.00 
· ''On demand after date we promise to pay to the order 
of Vaughan & Company, Bankers, without offset, for value 
received, TWENTY THOUSAND & nojlOO Dollars, nego-
tiable and payable at Vaughan & Company, and we,. and each 
of us, makers· and endorsers jointly and severally waive 
the benefit of our homestead exemption as to this debt and 
also waive presentment, for payment, demand, protest and 
notice of dishonor. 'Ve appoint C. C. Vaughan, Jr., attorney 
in fact, with authority to confess judgment iri any court of 
la,v, or before the Clerk thereof, upon defalcation for the 
amount of this obligation and cost and attorney's fees of 
10 per cent for collection, and authorize execution to issue 
forthwith for amount of such judgment.'' 
page 27 ~ 
(Signed) BARRETT & BRO., (Seal) 
ENDORSEMENT. 
''We, the endorsers named below, 'vaive presentment, pro-
test, demand of payment and notice of non-payment and 
guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity, or 
any time thereafter, and agree tha.t all the provisions thm:e-
in sl1all apply to and bind us as though we were makers.'' 
(Signed) 1\tl. E. BARRETT, 
LINA BARRETT~ 
T. H. BARRETT, 
EFF A B:ARRETT, 
H. A. BARRETT. 
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was a contract of primary liability as thought the said H. A. 
Barrett were maker of the note, and was not a contract of 
secondary liability as if the said II. A. Barrett were an 
ordinary endorser of said note ; 
.And it further appearing to the Court that even if, prior 
to the entry of judgment on the said note, the liability of 
-said H. A. Barrett on said note had been a secondary liability 
as though he were an ordinary endorser, nevertheless, the 
said liability was by the entry of said judgment, m~rged 
into a fixed and primary liability; 
.And it further appearing t'o the Court that the language 
of said contract is definite, certain and free from ambiguity; 
Therefore, it is adjudged, ordered and decreed by the Court 
-that all the issues raised by the said answer and cross-bill, 
and the said supplemental answer and cross-bill of the de-
fendant, H. .A. Harrett, concerning his alleged secondary 
liability on said note and judgment and his alleged release 
therefrom on account of extension of time to the other parties, 
and on account of the failure of the plaintiff to use dili-
gence in collecting from the other parties, and on account 
of deposits made by the other parties, with the plaintiff, and 
concerning the alleged duty of the plaintiff to exhaust all 
·remedies· against the other parties, are immaterial to the 
proper disposition of this cause and are not defenses which 
are available to the defendant, H . .A. Barrett; 
And it further appearing to the Court, from statements 
made this day at the bar of court by counsel for the said 
defendant, H. A. Barrett; that the remaining por-
page 28 ~ tions of said answer and cross-bill, and said sup-
plemental answer and cross-bill are no longer re-
lied upon by the said defendant and are abandoned by him 
as defenses in this cause, with the exception of that portion 
of the answer and cross-bill alleging that certain personal 
property levied 011 under an execution on the said judgment, 
is not the property of the defendant, H . .A. Barrett, but is 
the property of his wife, Pearl Barrett; 
Therefore, the Court doth adjudge, order and decree 
that the entire answer and cross-bill, and supplemental an-
swer and cross-bill of the defendant, H. A. Barrett, be, and 
-the same are hereby stricken out with the exception of the 
allegation next above mentioned; and consequently, that the 
bill of the plaintiff be, and the same is hereby taken for 
confessed .as to the said defendant; 
And the court doth further adjudge, order and decree 
·that thi$ cause be, and the same is hereby referred to Chas. 
F. Urquhart, Jr., a commissioner of this Court, to ascertain 
and report to the Cou:!t, the following matters: 
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1. The names of the present owners of the items of real 
estate designated in the bill of the plaintiff as Items 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10: 
2. The fee-simple and annual value of each of the said 
Items of real estate: 
3. A list of the liens against each of the said items, with 
the amounts now due thereon, and showing the priority there-
of, including th~ plaintiff's judgment: 
4. vVhether the rentals of said items will, in five years, pay 
the said judgment in full. 
5. Any other pertinent matter which the Commissioner 
thinks proper to report. 
All of which said decrees and orders of the Court herein-
above set out are entered over the objection and exception 
of the said defendant, H. A. Barrett. 
page 29 ~ And a.t this same day, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court of Southampton County, on the 3rd day of 
August, 1933. 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County, Virginia. 
SUPPLENENTAL CROSS BILL AND AMENDED AN-
SWER OF H. A. BARRETT. 
Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a Corp., 
vs. 
Thomas I-I. Barrett et als. 
To the Honorable James L. McElmore, Judge of the said 
Court: 
This respondent, H. A. Barrett, for supplemental cross bill 
and amended answer to the bill of complaint filed against 
him and others by Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a Corpora-
tion, says as follows: 
That he again asserts that he is an endorser of the bond 
on which judgment ·was confessed against him and others 
on May 1, 1922, in favor of said complainant, and that he 
is now and always has been a party secondarily liable on 
account of said debt, bond andjor judgment as is shown by 
the terms of his endorsement on said bond, all of which 
facts have at all times been within the full knowledge of the 
said complainant, Vaughan & Company, and he again asserts 
that the time for the payment of said bond and judgment 
wns extended by the said Vaughan & Company to the prin-
cipal debtors as stated in his original answer and cross bill, 
H . .A. Barrett v. Vaughan & Co~, Bankers, and Others. 47 
each and all extensions of time were made for valuable con-
siderations, for a definite period of time and none of which 
extensions were made with the knowledge andjor consent of 
the said endorser, and in none of the said extensions of time 
was the right of recourse against t.his said endorser expressly 
reserved. 
This respondent further alleges that if, as this respondent 
specifically denies, the terms of his agreement as written 
Qver his endorsement on said bond obligated him as maker 
or bound him under the provisions of said bond . as though 
he were maker, he, nevertheless, has always considered him-
self as a party secondarily liable on said bond and judgment 
and that the obligee and judgment creditor, Vaughan & Com-
pany, Bankers, has likewise considered him and 
page 30 ~ treated him as a party secondarily liable and that 
it has never been the intention of any party in-
terested in this bond especially the said Vaughan & Com-
pany or your respondent tha.t the said H . .A. Barrett should 
be considered or in any way held responsible on said bond 
and/or judgment in any capacity except as one secondarily 
liable to whom there is and always has been the right of de-
fense on the ground that an extep.sion of time by the said 
Vaughan & Company to the principal debtors, Barrett & 
Brother, would be availing to this respondent. 
This respondent therefore prays that this supplemental 
cross bill and amended answer may be treated as a part 
of the original answer and cross bill filed by this respondent 
in this cause and that he may be granted the relief prayed 
for therein. 
And your respondent will ever pray, etc. 
H . .A. BARRETT, 
Respondent. 
By JUNIUS W. PULLEY, 
His .Attorney. 
page 31 ~ And at this same day, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court of Southampton County, on the 3rd day of 
August, 1933. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. 
Vaughan & Company, a corporation, 
vs. 
Thomas H. Barrett, et als. 
48 guprenie Court of Appeals of iVi~ginia. 
MOTION OF PLAINTIFF. · 
The plaintiff, Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, 
moves the court to strike the answer and cross-bill of H. A. 
Barrett, one of the defendants herein, filed February 10, 1933, 
and the supplemental answer and cross-bill of the said de-
fendant filed August · , 1933, for the reason that the issues 
raised by said answer and cross-bill and the said supple-
mental answer and cross.-bill are immaterial to the· proper 
disposition of this cause and are not available to the said 
-H. A. Barrett as defenses in this cause: · · 
VAUGI-IAN & COJ\IIPANY, BANKERS, 
By JOHN C. PARICER, JR., 
· Attorney. · 
·page 32 ~ And at this same day, to-wit: In the· Circuit 
Court of Southampton County,· oil the 3rd day of 
August, 1933. · 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Southampton County. 
Vaughan & Company, Bankers, a corporation, 
vs. 
Thoma§ )I. 'Barrett, et als. 
REPLICATION AND ANSWER OF PLAINTIFF TO 
SUPPLEMEN.TAL ANSWER AND CROSS-BILL 
OF H. A. BARRETT. 
· · The plaintiff, Vaughan & Company, Banke~s, a corporation, 
for answer to the supplemental cross-bill of H. A. Barrett and 
'for replication to the supplemental answer of H. A. Barrett 
this day filed · says : . . 
1. The plaintiff enters a gene1•al replication to all facts 
and conclusions stated in said supplemental answer and cross-
bill. 
VAUGHAN & COMPANY, B.A.NI{ER.S, 
By JOHN C. PARI{ER, JR., 
Attorney.· 
I'· 
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page 33 }- I, H. B. ~fcLemore, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, in the State of Virginia, 
do hereby certify that the foregoing is· a true transcript of a 
part of the record in the foregoing cause; and I further cer-
tify that the notfce required by Section 6339, Code of Vir-
ginia, was duly given in accordance with said section. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of September, 1933. 
H. B. McLEMORE, 
Clerk Circuit Court of ·Southampton County, 
Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
By: B. M. WILLS, 
Deputy· Clerk. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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